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The Afghan Solution is an important book and one that needs to be read by anyone wondering why American and British intelligence got it so wrong with the start of the October 7, 2001 war in Afghanistan. And how we could have avoided America's longest war had western policymakers been better informed and less arrogant about how to deal with this highly complex central Asian country. More to the point, it is the story of how the Taliban could have been defeated by Afghans rather than foreigners, why the West thwarted that plan and what it means for NATO today as it seeks to leave Afghanistan. Written by a Geneva-based British author Lucy Morgan Edwards, who worked as a journalist but also as an advisor to the European Union during the critical post-2001 period, The Afghan Solution focuses specifically on efforts by a group of mainly Pushtun tribal leaders, commanders and senior figures within the Taliban to establish a new anti-Talib alliance. Figure-headed by the still broadly respected former king, this could have resulted in a viable Afghan solution to a conflict that had already dragged on for more than two decades. Had the Americans, British and others supported this initiative, there is a good chance that Afghanistan would be at peace today.

Instead, the United States and Britain childishly and over-emotionally wanted "fireworks" to revenge the 9/11 attacks on US soil despite numerous warnings by informed individuals, both Afghan and expatriate, that this would only ignite further resistance against the West. The Bush administration also confused the Taliban as a terrorist organization rather than just another Afghan faction in the country's ongoing civil war that takes support from whomever is willing to give it, regardless whether al Qaeda, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or the United States.

As a result, the western intervention by US and British forces to punish the Taliban for their hosting of al Qaeda established the scenario for renewed conflict, which now threatens to become NATO's Vietnam. For this reason, both the Bush and Blair administrations must bear much of the responsibility for sending over 2,700 young US, British and other Coalition soldiers to their un-necessary deaths - almost as many as those who died in the 9/11 attacks - in a war which has also killed over 18,000 Afghans.

More specifically, The Afghan Solution focuses on the attempts of former resistance commander, Abdul Haq, a renowned urban guerrilla strategist during the Soviet war, to engineer this new anti-Talib alliance. Lacking western support, he headed into Afghanistan several weeks after 9/11 on his own impetuous mission to save the initiative. However, he was betrayed and assassinated by the Taliban, possibly at the behest of the Pakistanis and Arabs - and with the knowledge of US forces.

According to Morgan Edwards, more than half the Taliban and their supporters were ready to cross over to the new anti-Talib alliance, but this extraordinary opportunity dissipated the moment US and British warplanes crossed into Afghan airspace. Hence the importance for Americans and Westerners involved with Afghanistan to understand what could have happened had Washington and London not been so utterly ignorant - or stupid in plain English - given all the intelligence resources at their disposal.

Based on detailed research, Morgan Edwards, who never met Haq but certainly admires him, got to know his family well. She explores what happened during those decisive days leading up to 9/11 and beyond. She also interviewed numerous key individuals, such a John Gunston and Ken Guest, both former British soldiers-turned-journalists, who had known Haq well and were seeking to promote this potentially broad-based initiative with the CIA and MI6, but to no avail. The Richie brothers, American Republicans who had lived in Afghanistan during their youth and later made their fortunes on the Chicago options exchange, were also involved in financially supporting the initiative.

To those who knew him, particularly western journalists covering the Soviet war, Abdul Haq was a savvy, jovial but also hard man. Together with Ahmed Shah Massoud, Ismail Khan and few other leading commanders, Haq was one of the few Afghans who could have helped lead the country to a new and peaceful future. But all of them were placed on the outside by the CIA, MI6, ISI and the Saudis because they represented not only free-thinking threats, but also true Afghan nationalists.

A member of the highly respected Arsala family based in eastern Afghanistan's Nangrahar Province, Haq was firmly remembered by many for his audacious attacks against communist targets in Kabul. He was also revered for his dogged sense of independence and un-willingness to kowtow to the Peshawar-based resistance parties, the Pakistani military intelligence organization ISI and the CIA, which were favouring fundamentalist extremists, including Osama bin Ladin, with massive funding and weapons against the Soviets. Furthermore, Haq repeatedly warned of the growing danger of foreign Islamists, particularly the Arabs, operating on Afghan soil.

As Morgan Edwards points out on various occasions, Haq became so disgusted with the infighting, much of it egged on by ISI, among the mujahideen following the Soviet war that he left Afghanistan for the Gulf. He only returned when he realized that the Afghan people had not only become tired of the former Jihadists and the Taliban, but also the constant dominance imposed on Afghanistan by the Pakistanis and Saudis. Numerous ordinary Afghans also wanted a new leadership which was credible, hence the willingness to accept both former King Zahir Shah, who represented a period of nostalgic peace, and Haq himself.

While the book remains a must-read and is certainly one of the best informed to have emerged about this period, some western aid workers and journalists with veteran Afghan experience have noted that Morgan Edwards falls into the trap of many dealing with this country. It is sometimes too parochial. Several aid workers, primarily French or European who have long admired Massoud, Ismail Khan and others, have described the book as "heavily biased" in favour of Haq and the Pushtuns rather than taking into account what was happening elsewhere in the country.

The Afghan Solution does indeed dwell overwhelmingly on Abdul Haq. It would have benefitted from more inclusion of what other Afghan commanders and community leaders were doing to subvert the Talib regime. Or to alert the Americans, British and others to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's massive role in supporting the Taliban and preventing any serious peace initiative.

Massoud, for example made his first trip to Europe in the spring of 2001, where he specifically warned Europeans and the Americans about a planned al Qaeda operation against the West. He also urged US officials to pressure the Pakistanis and Saudis to halt their support for the Taliban. If this were done, he maintained, the Taliban would collapse within the year.

As a journalist who has covered Afghanistan since October, 1979, three months prior to the Soviet invasion, I knew well both Abdul Haq and his brother Abdul Qadir (assassinated outside his Kabul office in 2002). Haq was by far the more charismatic and enjoyed taking western journalists with him "inside", particularly women such as New York Times correspondent Donatella Lorch, whose family he visited whenever in New York. He learned his English from working with British and American journalists.

Haq's influence, however, was only limited to the eastern parts of Afghanistan although he was certainly known throughout the country because of his guerrilla achievements. At the same time, he was part of a powerful "commanders of the interior" network whereby different local or provincial leaders collaborated with each other on an informal basis. Some of these later joined the Taliban but, as a result of their previous collaboration, were open to negotiation with Haq, Massoud and others.

While some have perceived Haq and Massoud as being rivals, the two in fact worked closely together, even if their relations often emerged as wary or frustrating. There is little mention of this collaboration in Morgan Edwards' book. Both men were strong leaders with their own personal ambitions. This was clearly personified by their ubiquitous picture posters - the Pushtun and the Tajik - being constantly placed together in numerous chaikhane (tea houses) or road signs throughout the late 1980s and 90s leading up to the events of 9/11.

Both Haq and Massoud were working together closely on the new 2000/2001 anti-Talib alliance initiative, Massoud from the north and Haq to the east. Massoud, however, was in a more difficult position to deal with exploratory talks outside the country. As the last commander of any significance resisting the Taliban inside Afghanistan, he had a war to fight. So much of the contacts with the former King in Rome or with the Americans and British in Washington and London, plus other influential figures in Peshawar and the Gulf, were left to Haq and his expatriate backers. Overall, however, it was very much a joint effort.

Morgan Edwards tends to gloss over some of the realities of war that make Haq, Qadir and others linked to the Arsalas seem too much like knights in white armour. Haq, for example, is portrayed as being a man who committed no abuses, but like many resistance commanders of the Soviet war, including Massoud and Ismail Khan, he killed his fair share. In fact, while meeting with him over dinner in Peshawar in the late 1980s, I asked him if he ever intended to return to Afghanistan if and when the war ever came to an end. He looked at me thoughtfully: "Probably not. I would not last very long. I have killed too many men - and in Afghanistan, people remember that."

The author also notes that the Arsalas had nothing to do with opium trafficking. Like numerous mujahed commanders, however, Haq and Qadir relied on opium sales to purchase guns. Once while filming with British cameraman Peter Jouvenal and Australian film-maker Chris Hooke at Qadir's mountain base not far from Tora Bora overlooking Jalalabad, we found his men casually weighing kilo upon kilo of raw opium for shipment to Pakistan. Qadir shrugged somewhat embarrassed: "How else are we going to fund our war?" To what extent this continued, if at all, during the Talib period, is unclear.

Overall, The Afghan Solution is a fascinating read offering a critical perspective to understanding what could have happened in Afghanistan - but did not. And now both ordinary Afghans and the international community are paying for it.

Edward Girardet is a journalist, author and produce, who has covered Afghanistan and other conflicts and humanitarian crisis zones worldwide. His book: Killing the Cranes - A Reporter's Journey through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan has just been published by Chelsea Green Publishers, Vermont. He is also editor of The Essential Field Guide to Afghanistan, now coming out in its 4th and fully revised edition.